The concept of session, the context under wh ich a user ac cesses resources is very important to apply acc ess control. We present first th e Contr olled Access Sess ion patter n for d escribing how sessions can lim it the ri ghts of a user . W e then combine this pattern with t wo exi sting access control p atterns. First we consider a patter n for Session-Based Role-Based Access Control, intended for organizations in which job functions form the basis for privilege as signments. Then, we pres ent a Session-Based Attribute-Based Access Control pattern for organizations in which accesses are controlled based on valu es of user attributes and object properties. Since the general properties of thos e patterns have been described earlier we emphasiz e the additional effect of using sessions. The Controlled Access Session pattern can also be combined with other models of access control or used on its own.
INTRODUCTION
It is important to develop s ystems where security has been considered at all s tages of de sign, which not only satis fy their functional specifications but also satisfy security requirements. To do this we need to start with high-level models that represent the security policies of the inst itution. There are three models currently used by most s ystems: the ac cess m atrix, t he RoleBased Access Control (RBAC) model, and the multilevel model.
One of the first security models was the access matrix. The basic access matrix [13] included the tu ple {s,o,t}, where s indicates a subject or active entity, o is the protected object or resource, and t indicates the ty pe of access permitted.
[ Har76] proved security properties of this model u sing the s o-called HRU (Harrison- Ruzzo-Ullman) model. In that model users are allowed to delegate their rights (dis cretionary property, delegatable authorization), implying a tuple {s,o,t ,f}, whe re f is a Boolean copy f lag indicating if the right is allowe d to be delegated or not. A predicate was added to the basic r ule to all ow content-based authorization [7] , bec oming {s,o,t ,p,f}, where p is the predicate (the predicate could als o include environment variables). Patterns for the basic rule and for the tuple {s ,o,t,p,f} were given in [9] [23] . The rule could also include the concept of Authorizer (a), becoming {a,s ,o,t,p,f} [8] (Explicitly G ranted A uthorization). RBAC [22] can be cons idered a special interpretation of the basic authorization model, where subjects are roles instead of individual users. W e presented two varieties of RBAC pa tterns in [9] and [23] . Subsequently, several variations and extens ions of thes e models have appeared. We presented a variation called MetadataBased Access Control, which later we renamed Att ribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [19] [20] .
ABAC can be seen in two ways:
• A s pecialization of the model {s ,o,t,p}, where p is a predicate which depends on attribute values.
• A variant where s and o are defined by descriptors which depend on attribute values.
In this paper we present a general pattern for a Controlled Access Session a s a building block and two p atterns combining this pattern with specific access contr ol models . The concept of session, the context under which a us er accesses resources is very important to apply access control. We present first the Controlled Access Session pattern for describing how sessions can limit the rights of a user. We then combine this pattern w ith a pattern for Session-Based Role-Based Access Control, inte nded for organizations in which job functi ons form the basis for privilege assignments. Then, we pr esent a Session-Based Attribute-Bas ed Access Control pattern for organizations in which ac cesses a re controlled based on values of user attributes and object properties. Since the general properties of those patterns have been described earlier we emphasize the additional effect of us ing sessions. The Controlled Acces s Ses sion pattern can als o be combined with other models of ac cess control or used on its own. The pattern diagram of Fig ure 1 shows the relationship s between thes e patterns. For example, adding a condition to Basic Authorization results in Conte nt-Based Authorization, us ing the concept of session res ults in s ession-based models , and s o on. Note that RBAC is, in general, not d elegatable. All these p atterns define authorization r ules and they need a reference monitor f or their Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. PLoP '06, October [21] [22] [23] 2006 , Portland, OR, USA. Copyright 2006 ACM 978-1-60558-372-3 /06/10…$5.00. enforcement; we don't s how it in this diagram for s implicity (see [23] for the correspo nding pattern). The double -lined patterns are the ones presented here. W e ass ume the reader to know bas ic security concepts and these p atterns are intended for system designers trying to add security to their designs.
Controlled Access Session
Provide a context in which a subject (us er, s ystem) ca n access resources with different rights and without need to reauthenticate every time he accesses a new resource.
Example
Lisa is a secretary in a medical organization but sometimes s he helps in the laboratory to perform patie nt tests. As a secretary she has ac cess to patients ' information such as name, addre ss, SS N, etc. This is necess ary s o she can bill them and their insurance companies. In the lab s he has access to anony mized patient test results. Combining the access es provided by her two jobs in one window she can ass ociate test res ults to names, which violates patient privacy.
Context
Any environment where we need to control access to computing resources and where us ers c an be clas sified ac cording to their jobs, groups, departments, assignments, or tasks.
Problem
A given us er may be a uthorized to access a system because s he needs to pe rform several functional ac tivities. H owever, for a particular access only those privileges should be active whic h are necessary to perf orm the int ended task. This is an appl ication of the principle of least-privilege a nd necessary to p revent t he user from mis using the system (intention ally, accidentally by performing an error, or without knowledge and tricked to do so, for e xample through a Troj an Horse att ack). Additionally this would potentially restrict damage in case of session hijacking. A successfully att acking process would not have all pr ivileges of a user available but only the active subset.
The following forces will affect the solution:
• Subjects may have many rights directly or indirectly through the execution contexts that they need for their tasks. Using all of them at one time may result in conflicts of interest and security violations. We need to res trict the use of those rights depending on the application or task the subject is performing.
• In the context of an int eraction we can make the access to some functions implicit, thus facilitating the use of the system and preventi ng errors that may res ult in vulnerabili ties. For example, som e editor s or other tools could be implicitly available in some sessions.
• It is not convenient to make subjects reauthenticate every time they request a new r esource. Once the s ubject is authenticated, this condition s hould remain valid during the whole session.
Solution
Define a unit of interaction, a session, which has a limited lifetime, e.g. between login and logoff of a user or between the beginning and the end of a transaction. When a user logs on and after authentication, the session activates some execution contexts with only a su bset of the authorizations she possesses. It should be the minimal s ubset which is needed for the user or transaction to perform the intended ta sk. Only thos e rights are ava ilable within the session. A subj ect can be in sever al sessions at the same time; however, in every s ession only the n ecessary r ights are active. Figure 2 shows th e clas s model of the Access Sess ion patter n. Classes Subject and Session have the obvious meaning. The class ExecutionContext contains the set of active r ights t hat the user may use within the session. Figure 3 shows the use case Open ( Activate) a session. A subject logs on and the logon interface authenticates it. The box with a double arrow indicates s ome authentication dialog or protoc ol. After the subject is authenticated, the i nterface cr eates a session object and returns a handle to the subject.
Structure

Dynamics
Implementation
Based on ins titution and application pol icies def ine w hich contexts (implying specific rights ) should be us ed in e ach tas k and grant them to the corresponding subject. The rights should be selected using the least privilege principle and there should be no contexts with excessive rights, e.g. the administrator rights should be divided into smaller sets.
Example resolved
Lisa can log on a s ecretary or as a lab ass istant but she cannot combine these activiti es in one ses sion. No w s he cannot r elate results to patient names. • Multics [Sum97] us ed exec ution context s (based on projects) to limit access right s. Ses sion Access is implemented in the s ecurity module CSAP [Dri03] of the Webocrat Sy stem in conju nction with an RBAC policy.
• Views in relational databases can be used to define sets of rights. Controlling the use of views by u sers can control their use of rights in s essions. This is do ne for example in Oracle and DB2, where SQL can be used to define restricted views [6] .
Consequences
This pattern has the following advantages:
• We can give to each context only the nee ded r ights according to its function and we can invoke in a ses sion only those contexts that are needed for a given task.
• We can exclude c ombinations of contexts that mig ht result in pos sible a ccess violati ons or conf licts of interest.
• Any functions can be made implicit in a session.
• Once a subje ct s tarts a ses sion it doesn't have to be reauthenticated. Its status is kept by the session.
Possible disadvantages:
• If we need to apply fi ne-grained access , it mi ght be inefficient to include many contexts to perform complex activities.
• Using sessions may be confusing to the users.
Related patterns
The A ccess Ses sion pattern is u sed in th e Session-Based R BAC and ABAC patterns, discussed later.
The Session pattern of [26] cre ated a session object that defined a namespace to hold all the variables that need to be referenced by many objects. P. Sommer lad remade this pattern as a Security Session [ 23] , int ended to prevent a us er to b e r eauthenticated every time he ac cesses a new object. A pattern wit h a s imilar objective to the previous one is Abstract Ses sion [21] : W hen an object's s ervices are invoked by clients, the s erver object may have to maintain state for each client. The server creates a session object that encapsulates s tate inf ormation for the client. The server returns a pointer to the ses sion object. However, none of these patterns cons iders limitation of rights . Our p attern is an extension of those patterns, concentrating all its security functions and emphasizing the function of a session as a limiter of rights.
Session-Based Role-Based Access Control
Allow ac cess to res ources based on the role of the s ubject and limit the rights that can be applied at a given time bas ed on the contexts (roles) defined by the access session.
Example
John is a developer in a proje ct. He is also a project lea der in another pr oject. As a project leader he can evaluate the performance of the members of his project. He combi nes his two roles and a dds several flattering evaluations about himself in the project where he is a developer. Later, his manager thinking that they came from the proj ect leader of that project, gives John a big bonus.
Context
Any environment whe re we need to control access to computing resources, where users can be classified according to their jobs or their tas ks, and wher e we as sign rights to the roles needed to perform those tasks.
We assume the existence of a S ession pattern that can be used for the solution.
Problem
In an organization a user may pl ay s everal roles. Howe ver, f or each access the user must act only within the authorizations of a single role (i.e. within the context of the role) or combinations of roles that do not violate ins titution policies . H ow do we f orce subjects to follow the policies of the institution when using their roles?
In addition to the forces defined for the Access Session pattern, the following forces apply to the solution:
• People in institutions have different needs for access to information, according to their functions. They may have several roles associated with s pecific functions or tasks.
• We want to help the institution to define precise access rights for its members so that the least privilege policy can be applied when they perform specific tasks.. • Users may have more than one role and we may want to enforce policies such as separation of duty, where a user cannot be in two o r more specific roles in the same session.
Solution
A subject may have several roles. Each role collects the rights that a user can activate at a given moment (execution context), while a session controls the wa y of using roles and can enforce role exclusion at execution time.
Structure
The structure of the s ession-based RBAC is shown in the class diagram giv en in Figure 4 . The class Role is an interm ediary between s ubject and objec t holding all authorizatio ns a user possesses while playing the role and a cts here as an exe cution context. Within a Session, only a subset of the role s assigned to a Subject may be activated, i.e. only those necessary to perform the intended task. Roles may be composed according to a Composite pattern [11] , where higher-level roles acquire (inherit) rights from the lower-level roles.
Dynamics Figure 5 shows a sequence diagram to request access to an object. A subject has a lready opene d a s ession (S ee Figure 3 ) and he requests ac cess to an object in a specific way (access ty pe). The session uses the corre sponding Reference M onitor, which in turn checks if the rights of the session roles allow the access. If so, the access is permitted.
Implementation
See Section 5 for an example of a real implementation.
• Determine the ro les the system should contain (role catalog), according to the user functions or tasks.
• Collect lis ts of incom patible r oles and use these lists when a session is s tarted (static cons traints). These constraints can be defined using OCL or some other formal language as additions to the class diagram of the pattern.
• Determine the number of roles which may be active within a session (dynamic constraints).
• When a user opens a s ession s he mus t dec lare what roles s he int ends to use and the system w ill open the corresponding s ession or refus e to do so in case of conflicts.
Example resolved
When John logs on the project where he is a developer he only gets the rights for a developer and cannot add evaluations. When he logs on in the project where he is a project leader he can only evaluate the members of his group. He c annot combin e his role rights in the same ses sion and now he only gets legitimate evaluations.
Known uses
The structure and dy namics of a s ession-based RBAC are implemented in the security module CSAP [5] Views in relational databases can be us ed to define sets of rights. Controlling the use of views by roles can control the us e of rights in sessions. In bo th Ora cle and DB2 SQL can be used to define restricted views based on roles [6] .
Consequences
In addition to the a dvantages mentioned for the Acc ess Session pattern, other advantages of this pattern are:
• Sessions may include all needed roles for those subjects authorized for some task. • Fine-grained rights can be assigned to roles to enforce a need-to-know policy.
• When a s ession is open, we can exclude roles that violate institution policies.
Possible disadvantages include:
• Additional conceptual complexity to define which roles can be us ed together and which should be mutually exclusive.
• User conf usion if they have to use s everal r oles to perform their work.
Related Patterns
This pattern is a combinatio n of the Ses sion pa ttern described earlier a nd the RBAC pattern [23] . As indicated earlier , structuring of roles can be represented by a Composite pattern. A Reference Monitor pattern is needed t o enfor ce the use of rights during execution.
Session-Based Attribute-Based Authorization
Allow access to r esources based on the attr ibutes of the s ubjects and the properties of the objects but lim it the right s that c an be applied at a given time based on the context defined by the access session.
Example
Meili is a tee nager who li kes m ovies and s ubscribes to several movie servic es through the Internet . She logs in a centra l portal where she can reach a variety of movies. S ometimes she gets movies that she find s offensive or inappropriate (pornographic, racist, plain stupid). She doesn 't have much time to read details about the movies in advance and some of them don't e ven have good descriptions so reading about the movie s is not a good approach. She would like s ome kind of filter according t o h er characteristics and her prefer ences. Al so the portal may be breaking the law in making available to her some of these movies.
Context
Dynamic systems supporting a large set of objects and subjects in which the structure of the s ubjects changes rapidly, such as webbased information sy stems, e-government and e-business portals.
In this e nvironment ther e is the need to control access to computing resources and the sub jects may not be pre registered. We want to g ive access to r esources bas ed on characteristics of the subjects such as groups to which they belong, company for which they work, biological characteristics such as age or sex, or on characteristics of t he objects , s uch as ty pe of object, f iltering rules, or payment requirements.
Problem
As indicated access may depend on the age or other attributes of a user. In this case, privilege assignments to the user cannot be done statically by a s ecurity adm inistrator bu t autom atically b y the system based on the value of s ome o f the attributes , e.g. "DateOfBirth" . As t he us er gets older or changes functions his authorization state changes automatically . Acc ess rights might even depend on an external attribute, such as "phy sical location" of a user in a mobile environment. In thi s case the authorization state cha nges a utomatically whe n the user moves around. At the object's s ide, metadata s uch as the s cope of a document, or the MPAA rating of a movie a re examples of proper ties. A ll thes e constraints can be applie d through predicates in the rules [8] , but it is difficult to have a variety of prepackaged rules for the typical cases.
The solution is constrained by the following forces:
• We need to limit the rights of s ubjects that are in a variety of groups or roles, or have special characteristics. Unrest ricted ac cess migh t allow pol icy or law violations.
• This control should not imply a n extra burden for the security administrator or s ecurity vulnerabili ties may appear through administration errors.
• This control should not imply a significant performance overhead, or the system may not be practical to use. .
• The environment is very dynamic and cha nges shou ld be easy to make. Otherwise, the users will get annoyed and leave the system.
Solution
Access righ ts are based on the c omparison of values of s elected attributes of subjects and properties of objects (so c alled s ubject and object d escriptors). In this pattern descriptors are a construct to somehow "group" objects and su bjects dy namically, not explicitly by a n administrator but implicitly by their attribute or property values. This grouping may result in unpredictable sets of rights that may violate security policies. A session delimits the rights that can be applied at a given moment; that is, the subject attributes define a context for access rights. Figure 6 shows the class diagram for the s olution. A Subject Descriptor is fo rmed by apply ing Qualifiers (>, +,…) to Attribute Values to define cons traints such as 'age > 15' . A Session selects some specific attribute values as execution context that defin es the Subject descriptor at this moment. S imilarly, objects are defined based on the values of selected attributes.
Structure
Implementation
1) Select a n a ppropriate pac kage to convey the s ubject's credentials including attributes. Examples wou ld be attribute certificates [15] [17] or Kerberos tickets.
2) Select an im plementation to e xpress the object' s attributes. Candidates could be s tandards on meta-data res ource discovery , such as the Dublin Core Metadata Initiative [DCM].
3) Define an enforce ment mec hanism for the righ ts defined in contexts. See for example [2] . 
Example resolved
The portal implemented an ABAC model. Now when Meili opens a session she is given acce ss to contexts with sets of preselected movies according to her pr eferences and restr icted a ccording to legal aspects and to the services she has paid for.
Known uses
Session-based ABAC is implemented as a n alternative to RBAC in the s ecurity m odule CSAP [5] of the W ebocrat system. A similar patter n is als o us ed in the author ization system of the .NET component framework [14] and in AAIs (authentication and authorization infrastructures), s uch as Permis [1] and Shibboleth [24] .
The XM L s tandard XACML [4] [16] uses attributes of s ubjects and objects for the s pecification of access control policies. As shown in the UCON ABC [18] , ABAC may also have potentia l for digital rights management.
Consequences
The advantages of this pattern include:
• The rights of subjects that belong to a variety of groups, roles, or have special attributes can be limited by restricting them to us e s pecific contexts s elected by sessions.
• This c ontrol do es not imply an extra burden for the security admini strator because the contexts can be defined by applicatio n des igners according to application policies.
• This control does not imply a significant performance overhead because changing from o ne context to another just means changing a set of rights.
• Changes in access r estrictions can be easily accommodated by defining new contexts or deleting existing contexts.
Possible disadvantages are:
• Higher complexity. Although the contexts are defined by others, it is hard for administrators to know who has access to what.
• There might still be som e performance overhead if we need to switch often between contexts. Figure 1 s hows the relations hip of t his patt ern to other access control patterns . As indicated credentials s uch as certif icates are frequently used to request access [15] .
Related Patterns
Using session-based access control as a service
In this section we show by means of two sequence diagrams how the patterns described above can be embedded into a general authentication, author ization and access control s ervice. Such a service can be c alled by any application or p rocess having the need to authenticate the users and to provide session-based access control. In the foll owing it is ass umed that the service provides both session-based RBAC and session-based ABAC and the client application requesting the service must chose between the two. Figure 7 shows a sequence diagram for the intera ction of a requesting client process and the s ession-based access contr ol service. In order to hide the complexity of the subsystems, in the sequence diagram we use the Facade pattern [1 1] as a uniform interface for calling applications.
In order to be able to a ccess a resour ce, a valid session object must be requested by the calling applicatio n (or us er proces s). This starts w ith som e sort of initi alization process during w hich the client application first requests from the authentication facade of the security service an authentication service. In the example of Figure 7 , a password serv ice is returned but also other services may be available. Second is the request for an authoriz ation service. In the example, RBAC is returned, and the initialization phase is f inished. N ext is the actual u ser authentication, role selection and the s ession es tablishment. During user authentication the client application provi des to the pas sword service <user-id, pw d>. The pas sword ser vice interacts w ith a userDM and in case o f s uccessful log-in a user object is created and a ref erence to the obj ect ( aUser) is retur ned to the calling client application.
A valid s ession can only be esta blished in the cas e the user application activates at least one role from the set of possible roles for the user. This sta rts by calling the method getAssignedRoles of the user object. In case of a valid userID all available roles for a p articular us er are determ ined a nd returned by t he r ole data module (RoleDM ) and f or each role a tr ansient r ole object is created by the RBAC service. Next from the s et of pos sible roles the user s elects a sub set and the RBAC serv ice calls the corresponding method to activate the roles.
At this stage the user object is authenticated and ha s a set of active r oles as signed. These ar e t he o nly prerequisites for establishing a ses sion. After receiving the r equest the ses sion service creates a valid s ession object for which the session-id is returned as a reference for the calling client process. Under a valid session-id the client may act under the context of the session by using the privileges of the selected roles. Figure 8 shows an attempt of a client pr ocess to access a resource within a valid session. The process starts with calling the method checkAccess with parameters session-id, object-id, operation, i.e. a request of a user wishing to access a c ertain object by using a predefined operation and this all wit hin the c ontext of an established session. F irst, the validit y of the session is checked, then the s ession object is used by the RBACService in order to get the user' s active ro les w ithin this s ession. N ext, the us er's permissions are d etermined by re trieving all the perm issions assigned to the active rol es. Fi nally, the RBACSer vice c hecks whether there is a permission for the tuple <object, operation>. In the case there is one, the access will be granted, otherwise denied. 
Conclusion
We have shown patterns to des cribe the effect of s essions on access contr ol models . W e pres ented fir st t he Access Session, which describes the basic concept of s ession as a limiter of rights. We then combin ed thi s pattern wit h the patter ns of two access control models to show its effect on them. Finally we s howed an example of a system usi ng the las t two pattern s as a wa y to illustrate a real implementation.
